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Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) 
innovations with regards to improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It situates PIRA’s 
tactical innovations within the broad organizational psychology literature focused on 
the nature and drivers of creativity and innovation. This discussion helps frame the 
two empirical analyses that follow. The first analysis provides a graphical timeline of 
PIRA’s radical innovations (and their drivers) in relation to IED technology. This 
helps provide a sense of the specific occasions in which PIRA innovations were 
numerous and when they were sparse. The second analysis looks at the locations in 
which PIRA radical innovations debuted. This provides us with an understanding of 
the specific PIRA units responsible for these innovations. The results demonstrate that 
whilst PIRA operations spanned the six counties of Northern Ireland for 29 years, 
radical IED innovations were conceived, developed and initially implemented within 
only two areas of operations for only seven of those years. 
  
 Introduction 
In November 1971, the London-based Institute for the Study of Strategic Conflict 
published a booklet entitled ‘The Spreading Irish Conflict’. The authors refer to 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) members as “clumsy”, “disorganized” and 
unimaginative terrorists”. PIRA deployed “amateurish” tactics. “Their bomb attacks 
up till mid-1971 often amounted to nothing more than a man nervously lobbing a 
petrol bomb so badly made that the wick falls out before it reaches its target”.1 Fast 
forward to the past decade and synopses of PIRA’s capabilities look very different. 
Jackson’s in-depth study of terrorist learning outlines, “PIRA developed a reputation 
for its capabilities with explosives ad the application of advanced technologies in the 
construction and use of bombs, mines, and other devices. These capabilities 
developed over time as a results of an intense learning process within the group.”2 
Oppenheimer refers to PIRA’s “unparalleled ingenuity in IED making.34 Others note 
“PIRA is widely recognized as overseeing the greatest innovation and deepest 
expertise in the construction and deployment of IEDs by any non-state violent 
organization”.5  
 
Are these two strikingly different positions purely just a by-product of the time these 
assertions were made? In other words, is it a case of PIRA simply improving their 
operations between the publication of the initial report and the later citations? Or is it 
a case of both approaches perhaps over attributing their position to PIRA as a whole 
rather than the specific sub-units tasked with innovations and tactical deployment? 
This paper seeks to answer these questions in a number of ways. It situates PIRA’s 
tactical innovations within the broad organizational psychology literature focused on 
the nature and drivers of creativity and innovation. This discussion helps frame the 
two empirical analyses that follow. The first analysis provides a graphical timeline of 
PIRA’s radical innovations (and their drivers) in relation to IED technology thus 
highlighting the drivers of why PIRA needed to learn. This helps provide a sense of 
the specific occasions in which PIRA innovations were numerous and when they were 
sparse. The second analysis looks at the locations in which PIRA radical innovations 
debuted. This provides us with an understanding of the specific PIRA units 
responsible for these innovations.  
  
Theory 
 
In the past couple of decades, the study of creativity and innovation emerged as a 
vibrant and empirically rich area of study within the wider industrial and 
organizational psychology field. Despite the clear implications this field has for the 
study of terrorism only a few studies applied these insights into the study of terrorist 
organizations.6 Research on creativity/innovation is largely in agreement on four 
factors. First, different types of innovation exist. Second, creativity does not equal 
innovation. Third, innovation is typically a process with different drivers. Fourth, 
innovations can be radical or incremental. The below sections elaborate upon these 
statements with reference to illustrative examples from PIRA’s history. 
 
Different Types of Innovation Exist 
 
Many early studies of terrorist innovation emphasized the distinct lack of creativity 
and innovation within terrorist organizations. One distinguished scholar, for example, 
argued that compared to conventional war, terrorism “has not changed much in the 
course of a century, and virtually not at all during the last 25 years.”7 Hoffman agrees, 
noting the terrorist attacks’ remarkable consistency and conservative nature over 
time.8 Dolnik refers to terrorist attacks as “relatively limited and remarkably 
unchanging”.9 Many recent studies, however, take a more fine-grained approach to 
what encompasses innovation and came to very different conclusions. Crenshaw 
highlights three different types of innovation.10 First, tactical innovation involves the 
adoption of new technologies to achieve long-lasting strategic objectives. One 
example of a PIRA tactical innovation is the systematic use of car bombings against 
Northern Ireland’s economic heart. The empirical analysis, below, focuses upon 
tactical innovation and elaborates upon many of these endeavors in greater depth. 
Second, strategic innovation involves adopting new objectives. For example, PIRA’s 
increasing politicization through the 1980s and 1990s, reflected in the growing power 
and status of its political wing Sinn Fein, largely reflects a strategic innovation at the 
elite level of the movement.  
 
Third, changes organizational/structural changes exhibit organizational innovation. A 
large-scale re-organization of PIRA’s structure to a tighter cellular based network in 
which cells acted independently of one another occurred between 1977 and 1980.11 
Previously, PIRA structured itself like a conventional army with various brigades, 
battalions and companies responsible for specific geographical combat areas. This 
change placed far less emphasis on the quantity of recruits and far more emphasis on 
secrecy and discipline than the preceding phase. Almost instantly, the effects of the 
structural changes became noticeable with 465 fewer charges for paramilitary 
offences occurring within a year.12 
 
Creativity does not equal innovation 
Creativity and innovation are not the same thing. Creativity involves generating ideas 
and novel concepts. Innovation involves implementing these ideas.13 In the context of 
learning  (the topic of this special issue), creative thinking is a response to learning 
about the need for improvement (be it through effective counter-terrorism or another 
source), whereas innovations are the proof that lessons learned and the solutions 
applied were correct. For an innovation to occur, it must first go through a creative 
process from idea generation through to full implementation. If a very creative act of 
violence is devised, but the group lacks the capability to carry it out, the creative 
output will fall short of being an innovation. Such issues were common in PIRA’s 
history especially with regards to delivery methods of IEDs. For example, an early 
PIRA incendiary device utilized a condom as a fuse delay device. The device entailed 
filling a condom with sulphuric acid. The time the acid took to dissolve the rubber 
acted as the time delay mechanism. Upon dissolving, the acid reacted with the 
incendiary material and produced fire. Two reasons led to this device’s demise. First, 
although it was highly novel, original, relevant and elegant, it was highly dangerous 
to the operator.14 The main resistance to this bomb however came from individuals 
who refused to store caches of condoms, previously proscribed by the Catholic 
Church, in their homes.15 
 
Other highly creative ideas were also soon consigned to the dustbin after one use. For 
example, on August 10th 1971, PIRA militants pushed a 50lb. gelignite bomb down a 
sewer pipe. The intention was for the bomb to float under an Army post that was 
occupied by 330 soldiers at the time. Unfortunately for PIRA, the Volunteers used the 
incorrect pipe and the bomb instead exploded under an unoccupied drinking club 
instead.16 Another particularly creative delivery system used in May 1992 involved a 
stolen Hitachi excavator and laundry van. PIRA volunteers removed the van’s tires to 
make it capable of running along the railway track on its rims. The excavator lifted 
the laundry van onto the tracks. The van was loaded with 1000lb of explosives and 
plentiful command wire. The van was put into gear and sent along the track, 
driverless. Its open backdoors allowed the command wire to fall alongside the railway 
tracks. As it got close to an Army Barracks, it was detonated, killing one of the 
sentries in the process. Another example is the January 1974 airborne IED attack. 
After forcibly taking control of a helicopter and its pilot, PIRA volunteers attempted 
to drop a milk churn full of explosives upon a police station in the town of Strabane. 
The milk churn jammed in the helicopter’s door. The second milk churn bounced 
harmlessly off the police station wall and landed in an adjacent garden without 
exploding. Finally, a March 1977 attack on the home of a husband and wife who were 
both RUC Reserve members, involved suspending a bomb down a chimney by a 
piece of string. The bomb was later successfully defused.17 
 
If we look at creativity and innovation as a process, phase-specific intervention points 
may identifiable for counter-terrorism practitioners thus demonstrating the practical 
importance of understanding the nature of the creative process within terrorist 
organizations.18 
 
Innovation is typically a process with different drivers 
Contrary to common perception, innovation and creativity is not akin to a 
spontaneous flash of a light-bulb moment. Instead, they result from a well-aimed, 
intentional search for improvement.19 Most process models of creativity follow a 
general pattern of problem definition, idea generation and exploration, and idea 
implementation.20 Gill et al. outline a conceptual framework for understanding 
innovation and creativity in terrorist networks.21 They outline how aspects such as the 
greater environment (distal grievances, contemporary counter-terrorism practices, 
inter-group competition, political opportunity structure), organizational dynamics 
(organizational age, member age, previous success, structure, size, reward structure, 
collaborative environment, trust, finances, external support), small-group dynamics 
(team composition, size), individual characteristics (expertise, experience, personality 
traits, achievement motivation, autonomy, risk-taking) and leadership characteristics 
(technical expertise, participatory decision-making) collectively impact upon a 
group’s capacity for creativity. From there, a mixture of extrinsic and intrinsic 
motivations coupled with creativity facilitators (exposure to novel problems, goal 
awareness, freedom, reward for creativity, resource availability, idea exchange) help 
produce a creative output. To become an innovation, the output depends upon a 
number of additional innovation facilitators (secrecy from counter-terrorism 
community, supporter acceptance, inter-group competition, implementation resources, 
capabilities and capacities, organizational elite support, idea champions). To be 
considered an innovation it needs to be novel, relevant, elegant and generalizable.  
 
Innovation can be Radical or Incremental 
There are two forms of product innovation– incremental and radical innovation. 
These variants differ in the degree to which they are revolutionary and novel. Radical 
innovation consists of fundamental changes that strike a clear departure from existing 
processes and products. Incremental innovation describes small adjustments to the 
current technology or product.22 PIRA’s development of mortar bombs is a perfect 
example of incremental innovation. Responding to the increased fortification of police 
stations and army barracks, PIRA needed to develop a stand-off weapon capable of 
circumventing the fortification. The original stand-off weapon, labeled by the British 
Army the ‘spigot grenade’, was propelled from a standard shotgun. It was quite 
primitive, made from packing a pound of gelignite into a 6-inch pipe taped to a 
wooden pin. It was also hazardous to the user. As mentioned previously, user safety 
was a high-priority in any PIRA military action and because of this the ‘spigot 
grenade’ was quickly abandoned and the systematic development of safer, more 
accurate and destructive mortars began.23 Mark 1 mortars emerged in June 1972. The 
nose fuse, according to Explosive Ordnance Teams (EOD) was of “ingenious design”. 
However, many propelled Mark 1 mortars failed to explode because of the angle of 
contact – the mortar tended to spin in flight. Trigger operated, and lacking a safety 
mechanism or delay circuit, the Mark 1 was highly dangerous to the operatives. It was 
only used twice. By December 1972, the Mark 2 was in use. It contained a kilogram 
of commercial explosive. No longer trigger operated, the Mark 2 instead propelled 
from an L-shaped base plate. It also incorporated a five-second delay to improve 
operator safety. The nose-cone’s fuse was simplified and made more durable. It was 
used 25 times in its first four months. However, aiming reliability did not improve 
because of volatile base-plate movement. In June 1973, PIRA fired 16 Mark 3’s in 
Derry and Omagh. Firing distance improved to 250 meters, as the explosive used was 
half the weight of the Mark 2. Accuracy also enhanced because of the stronger base 
plate and because of the introduction of “an aiming quadrant which set the line of fire 
by rotating the barrel and locking it into position”.24 However, despite the 
improvements, the explosive mixture was highly volatile and now included items 
such as sodium chlorate and high-grade crystalline ammonium nitrate. This volatile 
mix led to premature explosions and explosions in flight. It was used 105 times in 14 
separate attacks in its opening six months.25  
 
The Mark 4 arrived in February 1974 and increased firing distance further to 400 
meters. Ball bearings and shrapnel were added to the design. However, the lack of a 
safety mechanism again increased the danger for the militants themselves. It was 
abandoned within six months of its first use. “The Mark 5 included a ‘bombard’, a 
primitive cannon of around 25 meters range”.26 Because of its early capture in May 
1974 due to good intelligence, it was never used in an operation. The Mark 6 
(September 1974) was the first truly reliable mortar. The range improved 
considerably to 1,200 meters by improving the propeller (which was now wind-
driven) and fins. The base plate was military standard. Innovations in timing, and 
initiation components (incl. electronic components) were also included. Remote-
controlled detonation increased operative safety. Weapons specialist A.R. 
Oppenheimer notes that: “In just over a year, the IRA mortar had developed from 
something relatively primitive to an advanced weapons series”.27 The Mark 6 
remained the mortar of choice for a number of years. 
 
Marks 7 and 8 included more explosive power. Accuracy was drastically reduced 
however. The Mark 8 was an amalgam of previous models. It incorporated the tail 
fins of the Mark 3 and wind-driven propeller from Mark 6. By extending the casing 
tube from seven to thirty inches, the explosive charge was increased six-fold. Mortars 
were launched electronically with a 2.5 second gap between each firing. This became 
standard in later models. One report on the Mark 8 by the British Army noted this 
particular design was “the result of bastardising a mortar bomb from existing material 
by persons other than the designer. The terrorist is displaying a requirement to deliver 
an increased warhead for greater material damage with scant regard to accuracy, 
flight, ballistics, or range. All the technical advances which culminated in the Mark 6 
have been rejected in favor of inaccurate delivery of large charges the propaganda 
effect of which outweighs that achieved by many Mark 6s on the target”.28  
 
The Mark 9’s bomb design was shortened but was wider than the Mark 7 and 8. The 
warhead was an adapted industrial gas cylinder containing 10lb of explosives. 
Because of the danger of premature explosion, it was initiated via command wire. The 
latest model again suggested PIRA was opting for maximum carnage rather than 
accuracy. 
 
The Mark 10 was frequently used in Northern Ireland following its introduction by 
PIRA in 1979. This may be because it produced the first mortar related fatality in 
April 1980.29 It was also the Mark trusted for the Downing Street attack in 1991. It 
could fire 11kg of explosives up to 300 meters. The Downing Street attack involved 
mortars just over six inches in diameter and four feet long. This iteration was also the 
first design to incorporate multiple launching tubes. Typically, four large bolts 
secured the fuse to the mortar’s nose. The mortar also contained a heavy weight 
locked into place by a safety pin and was detonated by electrical timers. Upon firing, 
the pin ejects thus leaving the weight to move inside the mortar’s shell. On impact, 
the weight strikes the internal percussion cap at the front of the mortar and detonates. 
Initiated electronically but lacking accuracy, the device also incorporated a blast 
incendiary that was designed to detonate after the mortars were fired. The intention 
was to destroy the evidence and became a standard tactic in later models.  
 
The Mark 11’s range was 500 meters and could carry 50kg explosives. The Mark 12 
was a smaller model but held 2.5kg of Semtex and was first deployed in 1989. It 
differed from previous models, as it was a direct fire weapon. In effect, its design was 
a hybrid of a mortar and an armor-piercing rocket-propelled grenade. The effects of 
which successfully rendered the protection of armored vehicles regularly used by the 
British Army obsolete. The Mark 13 debuted in 1990 and sacrificed distance for more 
explosive power. It was made from a 45-gallon oil drum. Able to carry 36kg of 
explosives or 350lb of HME, its firing range was 25 meters. The Mark 14 (1992) 
could carry 20kg of HME. Mark 15 (1992) contained 75kg of explosives and coins as 
shrapnel. Referred to as the “barracks buster”, this iteration’s firing and launching 
mechanisms were perfected. Distance improved to 100-150 meters. It was 3 meters 
long. The tube consisted of a gas cylinder and scaffolding. The explosives were 
contained in a 45-gallon drum and fired from a JCB bucket. The use of everyday 
items would not arouse suspicion during the acquisition phase of development. A 
photoflash bulb acted as a trigger. This particular model was not reusable. From 1994 
onwards, the Mark 16 was used with greater frequency. It returned to the design of 
earlier shoulder-held models and was a horizontal mortar in the same vein as the 
Mark 11. The mortar fired from a disposable two and a half foot long tube and was 
accurate from a range of 50 meters. Typically, this version contained one and a half 
pounds of Semtex. The explosive effects of which also made this version capable of 
penetrating armored vehicles.  
 
We now turn our attention towards some original analyses centered on the radical 
innovations developed and adopted by PIRA. 
 
PIRA’S Radical Innovation Timeline 
 
The below figure illustrates a graphical timeline of PIRA’s radical innovations in 
relation to IED technology. The innovations (in red) consistently led to further 
innovations either through organizational mechanisms (in green) or through counter-
terrorist activities (in blue).  
 
Figure 1: PIRA’s Radical Innovation Timeline 
 
 
PIRA’s original IEDs were quite rudimentary in their design and utilized commercial 
explosives such as gelignite. The rudimentary nature of the IEDs made them easier 
for EOD operatives to dismantle/disrupt/prevent. By the tail-end of 1970, PIRA began 
to incorporate secondary devices into their IED design. This radical innovation was 
described in one EOD report as a “savage twist”. For example, the secondary devices 
within the ‘Castlerobin’ encompassed both anti-opening and anti-lifting micro-
switches. If the device was moved, tilted, or the top opened, it would detonate. It 
proved fatal to the first EOD operative to attempt to defuse it. A second EOD death 
through this particular type of IED illustrated more malevolent creativity. By burning 
the fuse on the IED, PIRA made the bomb look inoperable. However, anti-handling 
mechanisms detonated the bomb as the bomb disposal squad moved the device by 
wire. After five unexploded ‘Castlerobins’ were captured at a bomb making factory 
and its separate components were investigated, bomb disposal operatives quickly 
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learned how to successfully disarm this IED, the effects of which lead to incremental 
innovations and adaptations in terms of secondary devices throughout the course of 
the Northern Ireland conflict.30 The organizational learning experienced through the 
incorporation of electronics in their IEDs later led to the radical innovation of 
electronic timer units, radio initiation systems, and much later infra-red and light-
sensored initiation systems. 
 
After forensic investigation of PIRA’s early IEDs, measures were put in place to trace 
PIRA’s supply route of commercial explosives. British legislation responded by 
requiring producers to place markings on the explosives. This unmasked PIRA’s 
supply route. Explosives were traced to factories in Counties Cavan, Dublin, and 
Louth. A Joint Security Committee report to the Northern Irish parliament 
acknowledged that this forced PIRA’s hand to build homemade explosives.31 This in 
turn, led to PIRA pioneering the systematic use of car bombs. Coogan credits PIRA 
member Daithi O’Connell as the chief architect behind PIRA’s development of the 
car bomb, whereas Sean O’Callaghan pinpoints Seamus Twomey.32 For Ryder, the 
car bomb inherently possessed a number of advantages.33 They could carry far more 
explosives. A car’s space provided ample room to easily organize the firing 
mechanism. Both the car and the device can be booby-trapped. Planting a car bomb 
and keeping it undetected proved easier than a bomb encased in a box or a bag. 
Despite these clear tactical advantages of the car bomb, the decision to innovate with 
these devices reflects more practical concerns than proactive strategizing. PIRA’s 
dwindling stock of commercial explosive (because of effective British counter-
terrorism policy) forced their hand into experimenting with homemade explosives and 
in particular fertilizer-based explosives. These forms of explosives were typically 
heavier and bigger than commercial explosives and therefore needed a new more 
suitable delivery system. The effect of the homemade explosive was also exacerbated 
by the fuel within the exploding vehicle and helps account for the car bomb’s 
proliferation in the early 1970’s.34 Later, PIRA turned to using van bombs in order to 
lessen the line-of-sight of EOD teams (Ryder, 2006:152). 
 
The impact of the car bomb led to target hardening efforts by the security forces. 
Responding to the increased fortification of police stations and army barracks, PIRA 
needed to develop a stand-off weapon capable of circumventing the fortification. This 
led to the previously mentioned ‘spigot grenade’ which was subsequently quickly 
abandoned and the systematic development of safer mortars began.35   
 
This target hardening coupled with the wealth of road-checks and security cordons 
limited opportunities for car-bombing attacks. In order to continue causing economic 
damage (a goal that had moved to the forefront of PIRA’s new long war campaign), 
PIRA strategists instead turned to smaller, easily concealed, incendiary devices in the 
car bombs’ stead. The move toward using incendiaries was further stimulated by 
advances in electronic circuitry that had incrementally been added to PIRA’s original 
rudimentary devices. One report noted that a typical incendiary device could cause 
“as much as the largest car bomb”.36 While 1972 was the year of the car bomb, 1977 
was the year of the firebomb. This was largely because of a new ‘blast incendiary’ 
device. A larger device than previous incendiary IEDs, its various components 
included metal piping filled with commercial explosive attached to a one or five 
gallon container of petrol and a timer-power unit. Once detonated, the petrol further 
exacerbated the incendiary effect. Bomb intelligence experts originally believed that 
petrol was adopted in these devices so that PIRA could save their diminishing stock 
of commercial explosive. Upon realizing the destructive effect of this IED, its use 
increased.37 
 
PIRA’s strategic move toward ‘spectaculars’ also necessitated a longer timer to be 
developed. The basic principal was that the longer the timer, the greater distance the 
bomber could be from the site when detonation occurred. The longest time-delay 
device known was used in the assassination attempt on Margaret Thatcher. Here 
PIRA operatives modified a video player to set the IED twenty-four days, six hours 
and thirty-six minutes in advance of its eventual detonation 
 
In essence, the graphical timeline above illustrates that the vast majority of PIRA’s 
radical innovations occurred within six years of the group’s inception. From 1977 
onwards, there is relatively little progress in terms of new products. Of those products 
that did arise in the 1977+ era, they were barely used and did not become routine. So 
what changed in the immediate operating environment or within the group itself that 
impacted upon PIRA’s lack of innovation?  
 
First, PIRA’s structure changed in 1977. The urge for this change was borne out of a 
mixture of improved British intelligence, war weariness, and attrition. Facing these 
problems, PIRA decided a structural change was required that involved moving from 
an “outmoded pattern which was proving susceptible to penetration”.38 The blueprint 
– entitled ‘Staff Report’ – for this structural change was seized from leading PIRA 
member Seamus Twomey in December 1977. The Staff Report’s authors noted the 
PIRA ranks “are burdened with an inefficient infrastructure of commands, brigades, 
battalions and companies... We recommend reorganization and remotivation, the 
building of a new Irish Republican Army”.39 Emphasizing a return to secrecy and 
stricter discipline, the report created new departments within the organization 
(including Education Officers whose job entailed providing anti-interrogation lectures 
in conjunction with indoctrination lectures), outlined the new cell structure for urban 
based operations and the command and functional structures of these new cells, 
specified the new role for PIRA’s female and youth wings, instituted a new auxiliary 
unit to take over policing duties in Catholic strongholds, and a promoted the political 
wing Sinn Fein to the forefront.40 Together, these changes placed far less emphasis on 
the quantity of Volunteers and far more emphasis on secrecy and discipline.41 Gill et 
al.’s social network analysis of 1300+ PIRA members shows that the cluster of bomb-
makers became more centralized from 1980 onwards.42 This pooling of resources 
fostered an easier mechanism for intra-group communication, the effect of which 
seemingly normalized the return to the routine rather than fostering new innovations.  
 
Second, many of the situational crime prevention strategies employed by British 
forces had also become routine by the mid-1970s. Instead, security forces improved 
their intelligence and use of informants to prevent and disrupt plots at earlier stages. 
This new crime prevention strategy incentivized PIRA to innovate in areas other than 
tactics, namely organizational structure and training practices.  
 
Third, Gill and Horgan’s descriptive analysis of the PIRA cadre illustrates that the 
average age of new recruits became older as the conflict ensued and this may have 
impacted upon new innovations.43 Once PIRA’s training regime became enshrined in 
the ‘Green Book’ (rather than being carried out on an ad hoc basis), it prioritized 
routine over innovation because each individual recruit was given the same training 
and induction rather than having to make their own standards of practice due to 
organizational amnesia.  
 
Finally, the story of bomb-making innovation needs to be set within the wider context 
of where PIRA sourced weapons. The fall in innovation in the 1980s corresponds in 
time with Libya’s shipment of weapons and explosives to PIRA. This may have, in 
part, negated the need for new innovations.44  
Diffusion of Tactics 
 
During PIRA’s early innovative years, bomb-making was not undertaken centrally 
within the organization. Instead, it was up to individual brigades (each of which had a 
defined territory to operate within) to develop their own technology. The below table 
illustrates the innovator across a wide range of IED types and initiation systems. A 
striking feature of this table is that of the 18 radical innovations outlined, all but one 
of them debuted in either Belfast or Armagh, which suggests that these particular 
brigades were key to PIRA’s image as an innovative terrorist organization.  
 
Different factors may explain how these two groups learned. The units comprised of 
the Antrim Brigade largely conducted urban based bombing attacks in the city of 
Belfast. The vast majority of PIRA bombings were conducted there. This was a 
central hub of the Northern Ireland conflict. These operatives may have simply 
“learned from doing”, a case of trial and error. They were also the largest in terms of 
manpower, thus making the likelihood of innovations to occur here statistically 
higher. Interestingly, Gill and Horgan’s analysis shows that from 1980 onwards, the 
Antrim brigade’s size reduced considerably compared to others whose size grew 
through the 1980’s such as Tyrone and Derry.45 Perhaps another reason for PIRA’s 
lack of innovation post-restructuring may have come from the Belfast-brigades 
capacity being reduced.   
 
The Armagh Brigade, on the other hand, were largely a rural based unit with a largely 
supportive community of nationalists surrounding them and vast expanses of land 
available to conduct testing. The South Armagh Brigade were responsible for PIRA’s 
incremental mortar innovations, innovated in the use of radio-controlled bombs, 
pioneered the use of PIRA snipers, carried out the Warrenpoint attack that killed 18 
British soldiers, engaged in many of the ‘spectacular’ bombing attacks carried out on 
the British mainland through the 1990’s, became PIRA’s most proficient unit in 
attempting to shoot down British military helicopters, and were closely connected to 
weapons smuggling networks in the United States and Libya.46 What also set them 
apart from the rest of the group was their level of independence. Indeed, O’Brien 
portrays the South Armagh Brigade as an ‘independent Republic’ within the wider 
Provisional Irish Republican movement.47 For Moloney, the South Armagh Brigade 
was really “under the control of local chieftains…rather than part of a structured 
centrally directed organization”.48 As one former activist noted, “the leadership would 
never try to give them orders. There was virtually no control from the center. They 
mounted operations against the British, and the job of leadership was to provide 
resources, training guns, explosives, etc. You just could not guarantee that they would 
vote at a Convention for the leadership’s political strategy”.49 Like every other PIRA 
Brigade, the South Armagh Brigade was made up of an indeterminate number of 
active service units (ASUs), each in theory were supposed to contain four or five 
individuals. South Armagh ASUs displayed far more independence in target selection 
and operations in general than any other ASUs within PIRA’s broader structure.50 
Upon the march towards the Good Friday Agreement, which many saw as the end of 
the Northern Ireland conflict, a number of South Armagh based Volunteers left PIRA 
and formed the Real Irish Republican Army.  
 
 
The other striking feature of Table 1 is that although Belfast and Armagh were, by far 
and away, the main innovators, they were rarely the first adopter of the other 
brigade’s innovation. In fact, this only occurred once. This may suggest that there was 
no intra-group coordination between the two brigades or perhaps they were in 
competition with one another in relation to innovations and did not share pertinent 
information with one another. 
 
 
Table 1: PIRA IED Innovations and their Spatio-Temporal Diffusion 
 
Innovation Innovator Adopter 1 Adopter 2 Adopter 3 Adopter 4 Adopter 5 Innovation 
- Adoption 
Time 
Total 
Adoption 
Total 
Adoption 
Time 
IED Letter Belfast – 
August 71 
Derry – 
April 72 
Armagh – 
Nov 73 
Down – 
April 1975 
Tyrone – 
August 86 
N/A  6 Months No N/A 
IED Pipe Armagh – 
Jan 80 
Derry – 
Dec 81 
Tyrone – 
Oct 83 
Down – 
Aug 93 
Belfast – 
Sept 93 
N/A  1 Year 
11 Months 
No N/A 
IED 
Grenade 
Down – 
Sept 71 
Belfast – 
Sept 72 
Armagh – 
Dec 78 
Derry – 
Aug 81 
Fermanagh 
- Dec 87 
Tyrone – 
June 88 
1 Year Yes 16 Years  
3 Months 
IED 
Munition 
Armagh – 
8th Sept 72 
Tyrone – 
11th Sept72 
Fermanagh 
– 13th 
Sept72 
Belfast – 
June 77 
Down – 
June 80 
Derry – Feb 
89 
0 Months Yes 7 Years 
9 Months 
IED Bury Armagh – 
Jan 72 
Fermanagh 
– June 72 
Tyrone – 
Jan 73 
Derry – 
Feb 73 
Belfast – 
July 84 
N/A 5 Months Yes 12 Years 
5 Months 
IED Shape 
Charged 
Belfast & 
Derry – 
May 82 
Armagh – 
Aug 91 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 9 Years 
3 Months 
No N/A 
IED 
Undercar 
Belfast – 
Jan 72 
Fermanagh 
– Aug 72 
Tyrone – 
Dec 72 
Derry – Jan 
73 
Down – 
May 73 
Armagh – 
October 80 
7 Months Yes 8 Years 
9 Months 
IED – Car Belfast – 
Dec 71 
Derry – 
April 72 
Armagh – 
Jan 73 
Tyrone – 
May 73 
Fermanagh 
– Aug 73 
Down – 
May 74 
4 Months Yes 2 Years  
5 Months 
IED – 
Rocket 
Belfast – 
December 
72 
Armagh – 
December 
72 
Derry – 
December 
72 
Tyrone – 
February 
73 
Fermanagh 
– March 73 
Down – 
May 77 
0 Year (1 
week to 
Derry) 
Yes 4 Years 
5 Months 
Timer 
Initiated 
Belfast – 
Aug 70 
Tyrone – 
April 71 
Fermanagh 
– Feb 72 
Derry - 72 Armagh – 
April 75 
Down – 
April 1977 
7 Months Yes 6 Years  
8 Months 
Wire 
Initiated 
Armagh & 
Fermanagh 
– June 72 
Tyrone – 
July 78 
Derry – 
May 82 
Belfast – 
November 
83 
Down – 
June 1990 
N/A 6 Years  
1 Month 
Yes 18 Years 
Remote 
Initiated 
Armagh – 
December 
73 
Derry – 
March 74 
Fermanagh 
– June 78 
Tyrone – 
July 78 
Down – 
August 79 
Belfast – 
April 82 
3 Months Yes 8 Years 
4 Months 
Infrared 
Initiated 
Armagh – 
Jan 80 
Fermanagh 
– June 92 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 12 Years 
5 Months 
No N/A 
Booby 
Trap 
Initiated 
Armagh – 
October 71 
Derry – 
January 73 
Belfast – 
March 73 
Tyrone – 
Nov 74 
Down –
June  78 
N/A 1 Year 
3 Months 
Yes 6 Years 
8 Months 
Impact 
Initiated 
Belfast – 
Feb 70 
Derry – 
June 70  
Tyrone – 
Jan 74 
Down – 
May 77 
Armagh – 
Mar 79 
Fermanagh 
– Sept 88 
4 Months Yes 18 Years 
7 Months 
Victim 
Initiated 
Belfast – 
Jan 72 
Fermanagh 
–August 72 
Tyrone – 
December 
72 
Derry – 
May 73 
Armagh – 
November 
73 
Down – 
April 75 
7 Months Yes 3 Years 3 
Months 
Conclusion 
 
PIRA engaged in one of the longest paramilitary campaigns in modern times. One of 
the hallmarks of PIRA’s ability to survive and adapt was its substantial technical and 
innovative acumen in IED development. Although PIRA utilized a wide repertoire of 
violent tactics including, but not necessarily limited to, armed assaults, hostage 
takings, punishment shootings, assassinations and kidnappings, it is perhaps PIRA’s 
expertise in IED technology that has had the longest impact upon terrorist activity 
globally. Arguably PIRA was responsible for the greatest innovations and the deepest 
expertise in the construction and deployment of IEDs by any non-state militant group. 
PIRA IED technology emerged in conflicts within Colombia, Spain (especially with 
mortar technology), Israel, Lebanon, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The analyses throughout 
this paper however illustrate the importance of looking at terrorist organizations in a 
disaggregated manner and across time. While PIRA operations spanned the six 
counties of Northern Ireland for 29 years, innovations were conceived, developed and 
implemented within only two areas of operations for only seven of those years. The 
South Armagh Brigade, in particular. While the factors outlined in the Gill et al.'s 
model of malevolent creativity may not be readily apparent at the aggregate level, 
they may be apparent within a small cluster on the periphery of the whole network 
(for example the South Armagh Brigade).51 This small cluster can, in turn, have a 
disproportionate impact upon the organization’s image of being innovative. Looking 
at the scale of innovations across time also illustrates that a terrorist organization’s 
prolific output of tactical innovations can be interrupted once some of the factors that 
drove the process are absent or once a routine set of behaviors and tactics become 
institutionalized.  
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